Update.

1998-04-21 18:00  Ulrich Drepper  <drepper@cygnus.com>

	* iconv/gconv.c (__gconv): Remove bogus input buffer size computation.

	* iconv/gconv_open.c (__gconv_open): Initialize outbufend element.

	* iconv/gconv_simple.c (__gconv_transform_internal_ascii): Don't use
	character in comparison with uint32_t.
	(__gconv_transform_internal_utf8): Specify MAX_NEEDED_TO.
	(__gconv_transform_utf8_internal): Specify MAX_NEEDED_FROM.
	Optimize BODY a bit.

	* iconv/loop.c: Require MIN_NEEDED_INPUT and MIN_NEEDED_OUTPUT to
	be defined.

	* iconv/skeleton.c: Also reset converted counter in case of an error.
	Call reset function using correct value for output buffer start.

	* iconvdata/Makefile: Re-enable tests.

	* iconvdata/iso8859-1.c: Swap MIN_NEEDED_INPUT and MIN_NEEDED_OUTPUT
	value for to-conversion.

	* iconvdata/TESTS: Add new third column.
	* iconvdata/run-iconv-test.sh: Add support for charsets which are
	not ASCII based.
	* iconvdata/testdata/suntzus: New file.

	* elf/dl-minimal.c (__strtol_internal): Increment pointer to string
	while reading.  Correctly used base.  Little optimization.
	(__strtoul_internal): Likewise.

	* elf/rtld.c (dl_main): Test to avoid duplicate call of _dl_init_paths
	was wrong.  Use explicit variable.

1998-04-20 23:49  Zack Weinberg  <zack@rabi.phys.columbia.edu>

	* configure.in: Check for awk.
	* config.make.in: Add AWK to be substituted.

	* manual/xtract-typefun.awk: Rewrite to eliminate gawk extensions.
	* manual/users.texi: Fix typo exposed by above rewrite.

	* Makefile: Invoke awk using AWK variable.
	* csu/Makefile: Likewise.
	* elf/Makefile: Likewise.
	* mach/Makefile: Likewise.
	* manual/Makefile: Likewise.
	* sysdeps/gnu/Makefile: Likewise.
	* sysdeps/mach/hurd/Makefile: Likewise.
	* sysdeps/unix/Makefile: Likewise.
	* timezone/Makefile: Likewise.

1998-04-10  Gordon Matzigkeit  <gord@profitpress.com>

	* sysdeps/gnu/errlist.awk (ERR_REMAP): Implement error code to
	array index translation.
	(SYS_ERRLIST_ALIAS, SYS_NERR_ALIAS): Make weak aliases only if
	these are defined.

	* sysdeps/mach/hurd/Dist: Add errlist.c to distribution.

	* sysdeps/mach/hurd/errlist.c: New file.
	(ERR_TRANSLATE): Map Hurd error codes into errlist indices.
	(_hurd_errlist): The Hurd error list doesn't have Unix sys_errlist
	semantics, so rename it.

1998-04-16  Andreas Schwab  <schwab@issan.informatik.uni-dortmund.de>

	* iconvdata/run-iconv-test.sh: Make portable.  Always test all
	conversions.

1998-04-21 12:30  H.J. Lu  <hjl@gnu.org>

	* wcsmbs/wcsrtombs.c (__wcsrtombs): Initialize result to 0.
	* wcsmbs/wcsnrtombs.c: Likewise.

1998-04-21  Ulrich Drepper  <drepper@cygnus.com>

	* sysdeps/generic/dl-sysdep.c: Handle _dl_hwcap correctly.

	* wcsmbs/btowc.c (__btowc): Declare inptr as const char *.

	* time/strftime.c (my_strftime): Initialize pad variable in
	declaration.

	* iconvdata/big5.c: Don't use character constants in comparisons
	with unsigned value.

	* sysdeps/generic/setutxent.c: New file.
	* sysdeps/generic/getutxent.c: New file.
	* sysdeps/generic/endutxent.c: New file.
	* sysdeps/generic/getutxid.c: New file.
	* sysdeps/generic/getutxline.c: New file.
	* sysdeps/generic/pututxline.c: New file.
	* sysdeps/generic/utmpxname.c: New file.
	* sysdeps/generic/updwtmpx.c: New file.

1 files changed, 1693 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/iconvdata/testdata/suntzus b/iconvdata/testdata/suntzus
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4432c05674
--- /dev/null
+++ b/iconvdata/testdata/suntzus
@@ -0,0 +1,1693 @@
+

+

+

+

+                     SUN TZU ON THE ART OF WAR 

+            THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD 

+

+                    Translated from the Chinese 

+                    By LIONEL GILES, M.A. (1910)

+

+

+

+[This is the basic text of Sun Tzu on the Art of War.  It was

+extracted from Mr. Giles' complete work as titled above.  The

+commentary itself, which, of course includes this work embedded

+within it, has been released as suntzu10.txt (or suntzu10.zip).

+This is being released only as an adjunct to that work, which

+contains a wealth of commentary upon this text.]

+

+

+

+

+I. LAYING PLANS

+

+

+ 1. Sun Tzu said:  The art of war is of vital importance

+    to the State.

+

+ 2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either

+    to safety or to ruin.  Hence it is a subject of inquiry

+    which can on no account be neglected.

+

+ 3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant

+    factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations,

+    when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.

+

+ 4. These are:  (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth;

+    (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.

+

+5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete

+    accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him

+    regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.

+

+ 7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat,

+    times and seasons.

+

+ 8. Earth comprises distances, great and small;

+    danger and security; open ground and narrow passes;

+    the chances of life and death.

+

+ 9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom,

+    sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness.

+

+10. By method and discipline are to be understood

+    the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions,

+    the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance

+    of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the

+    control of military expenditure.

+

+11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: 

+    he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them

+    not will fail.

+

+12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking

+    to determine the military conditions, let them be made

+    the basis of a comparison, in this wise:--

+

+13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued

+        with the Moral law?

+    (2) Which of the two generals has most ability?

+    (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven

+        and Earth?

+    (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?

+    (5) Which army is stronger?

+    (6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?

+    (7) In which army is there the greater constancy

+        both in reward and punishment?

+

+14. By means of these seven considerations I can

+    forecast victory or defeat.

+

+15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts

+    upon it, will conquer:  let such a one be retained in command! 

+    The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it,

+    will suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed!

+

+16. While heading the profit of my counsel,

+    avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances

+    over and beyond the ordinary rules.

+

+17. According as circumstances are favorable,

+    one should modify one's plans.

+

+18. All warfare is based on deception.

+

+19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable;

+    when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we

+    are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away;

+    when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

+

+20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy.  Feign disorder,

+    and crush him.

+

+21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. 

+    If he is in superior strength, evade him.

+

+22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to

+    irritate him.  Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

+

+23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. 

+    If his forces are united, separate them.

+

+24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where

+    you are not expected.

+

+25. These military devices, leading to victory,

+    must not be divulged beforehand.

+

+26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many

+    calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. 

+    The general who loses a battle makes but few

+    calculations beforehand.  Thus do many calculations

+    lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: 

+    how much more no calculation at all!  It is by attention

+    to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

+

+

+II. WAGING WAR

+

+

+ 1. Sun Tzu said:  In the operations of war,

+    where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots,

+    as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand

+    mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them

+    a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front,

+    including entertainment of guests, small items such as

+    glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor,

+    will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. 

+    Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

+

+ 2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory

+    is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and

+    their ardor will be damped.  If you lay siege to a town,

+    you will exhaust your strength.

+ 3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources

+    of the State will not be equal to the strain.

+

+ 4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped,

+    your strength exhausted and your treasure spent,

+    other chieftains will spring up to take advantage

+    of your extremity.  Then no man, however wise,

+    will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

+

+ 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,

+    cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

+

+ 6. There is no instance of a country having benefited

+    from prolonged warfare.

+

+ 7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted

+    with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand

+    the profitable way of carrying it on.

+

+ 8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy,

+    neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.

+

+ 9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage

+    on the enemy.  Thus the army will have food enough

+    for its needs.

+

+10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army

+    to be maintained by contributions from a distance. 

+    Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes

+    the people to be impoverished.

+

+11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes

+    prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's

+    substance to be drained away.

+

+12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry

+    will be afflicted by heavy exactions.

+

+13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion

+    of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare,

+    and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated;

+    while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,

+    breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,

+    protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons,

+    will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

+

+15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging

+    on the enemy.  One cartload of the enemy's provisions

+    is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise

+    a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty

+    from one's own store.

+

+16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must

+    be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from

+    defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.

+

+17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots

+    have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. 

+    Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy,

+    and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. 

+    The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

+

+18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment

+    one's own strength.

+

+19. In war, then, let your great object be victory,

+    not lengthy campaigns.

+

+20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies

+    is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it

+    depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

+

+

+III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM

+

+

+ 1. Sun Tzu said:  In the practical art of war, the best

+    thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact;

+    to shatter and destroy it is not so good.  So, too, it is

+    better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it,

+    to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire

+    than to destroy them.

+

+ 2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles

+    is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists

+    in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.

+

+ 3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to

+    balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent

+    the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in

+    order is to attack the enemy's army in the field;

+    and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

+

+ 4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it

+    can possibly be avoided.  The preparation of mantlets,

+    movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take

+    up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over

+    against the walls will take three months more.

+

+ 5. The general, unable to control his irritation,

+    will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,

+    with the result that one-third of his men are slain,

+    while the town still remains untaken.  Such are the disastrous

+    effects of a siege.

+

+ 6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's

+    troops without any fighting; he captures their cities

+    without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom

+    without lengthy operations in the field.

+

+ 7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery

+    of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph

+    will be complete.  This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

+

+ 8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten

+    to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one,

+    to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army

+    into two.

+

+ 9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;

+    if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;

+    if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

+

+10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made

+    by a small force, in the end it must be captured

+    by the larger force.

+

+11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State;

+    if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will

+    be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will

+    be weak.

+

+12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring

+    misfortune upon his army:--

+

+13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat,

+    being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. 

+    This is called hobbling the army.

+

+14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the

+    same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant

+    of the conditions which obtain in an army.  This causes

+    restlessness in the soldier's minds.

+

+15. (3) By employing the officers of his army

+    without discrimination, through ignorance of the

+    military principle of adaptation to circumstances. 

+    This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

+

+16. But when the army is restless and distrustful,

+    trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. 

+    This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging

+    victory away.

+

+17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials

+    for victory:

+    (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when

+        not to fight.

+    (2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior

+        and inferior forces.

+    (3) He will win whose army is animated by the same

+        spirit throughout all its ranks.

+    (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take

+        the enemy unprepared.

+    (5) He will win who has military capacity and is

+        not interfered with by the sovereign.

+

+18. Hence the saying:  If you know the enemy

+    and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a

+    hundred battles.  If you know yourself but not the enemy,

+    for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. 

+    If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will

+    succumb in every battle.

+

+

+IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS

+

+

+ 1. Sun Tzu said:  The good fighters of old first put

+    themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then

+    waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

+

+ 2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our

+    own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy

+    is provided by the enemy himself.

+ 3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,

+    but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

+

+ 4. Hence the saying:  One may know how to conquer

+    without being able to do it.

+

+ 5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics;

+    ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.

+

+ 6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient

+    strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.

+

+ 7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the

+    most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in

+    attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. 

+    Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves;

+    on the other, a victory that is complete.

+

+ 8. To see victory only when it is within the ken

+    of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.

+

+ 9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight

+    and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

+

+10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;

+    to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight;

+    to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

+

+11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is

+    one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.

+

+12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation

+    for wisdom nor credit for courage.

+

+13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. 

+    Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty

+    of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is

+    already defeated.

+

+14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into

+    a position which makes defeat impossible, and does

+    not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.

+

+15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist

+    only seeks battle after the victory has been won,

+    whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights

+    and afterwards looks for victory.

+

+16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law,

+    and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is

+    in his power to control success.

+

+17. In respect of military method, we have,

+    firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity;

+    thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances;

+    fifthly, Victory.

+

+18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth;

+    Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to

+    Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation;

+    and Victory to Balancing of chances.

+

+19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as

+    a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.

+

+20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting

+    of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

+

+

+V. ENERGY

+

+

+ 1. Sun Tzu said:  The control of a large force

+    is the same principle as the control of a few men: 

+    it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.

+

+ 2. Fighting with a large army under your command

+    is nowise different from fighting with a small one: 

+    it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.

+

+ 3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand

+    the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken--

+    this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.

+

+ 4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone

+    dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science

+    of weak points and strong.

+

+ 5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used

+    for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed

+    in order to secure victory.

+

+ 6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible

+    as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams;

+    like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew;

+    like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.

+

+ 7. There are not more than five musical notes,

+    yet the combinations of these five give rise to more

+    melodies than can ever be heard.

+

+ 8. There are not more than five primary colors

+    (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination

+    they produce more hues than can ever been seen.

+

+ 9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes

+    (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations

+    of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.

+

+10. In battle, there are not more than two methods

+    of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two

+    in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.

+

+11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. 

+    It is like moving in a circle--you never come to an end. 

+    Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?

+

+12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent

+    which will even roll stones along in its course.

+

+13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed

+    swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy

+    its victim.

+

+14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible

+    in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

+

+15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow;

+    decision, to the releasing of a trigger.

+

+16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may

+    be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all;

+    amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head

+    or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.

+

+17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline,

+    simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness

+    postulates strength.

+

+18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is

+    simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under

+    a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy;

+    masking strength with weakness is to be effected

+    by tactical dispositions.

+

+19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy

+    on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to

+    which the enemy will act.  He sacrifices something,

+    that the enemy may snatch at it.

+

+20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march;

+    then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.

+

+21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined

+    energy, and does not require too much from individuals. 

+    Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize

+    combined energy.

+

+22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting

+    men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. 

+    For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain

+    motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope;

+    if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if

+    round-shaped, to go rolling down.

+

+23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men

+    is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain

+    thousands of feet in height.  So much on the subject

+    of energy.

+

+

+VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG

+

+

+ 1. Sun Tzu said:  Whoever is first in the field and

+    awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight;

+    whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle

+    will arrive exhausted.

+

+ 2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on

+    the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.

+

+ 3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy

+    to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage,

+    he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.

+

+ 4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;

+    if well supplied with food, he can starve him out;

+    if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.

+

+ 5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend;

+    march swiftly to places where you are not expected.

+

+ 6. An army may march great distances without distress,

+    if it marches through country where the enemy is not.

+

+ 7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks

+    if you only attack places which are undefended.You can

+    ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold

+    positions that cannot be attacked.

+

+ 8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose

+    opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful

+    in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.

+

+ 9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy!  Through you

+    we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;

+    and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.

+

+10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible,

+    if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire

+    and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid

+    than those of the enemy.

+

+11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced

+    to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high

+    rampart and a deep ditch.  All we need do is attack

+    some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.

+

+12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent

+    the enemy from engaging us even though the lines

+    of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. 

+    All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable

+    in his way.

+

+13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining

+    invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated,

+    while the enemy's must be divided.

+

+14. We can form a single united body, while the

+    enemy must split up into fractions.  Hence there will

+    be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole,

+    which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.

+

+15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force

+    with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.

+